The Seven Deadly Sins (Summer 2016)

William James:

I have been accused, when talking of the subject of habit, of making old habits appear so strong that the acquiring of new ones, and particularly anything like a sudden reform or conversion, would be made impossible by my doctrine. Of course, this would suffice to condemn the latter; for sudden conversions, however infrequent they may be, unquestionably do occur. But there is no incompatibility between the general laws I have laid down and the most startling sudden alterations in the way of character. New habits can be launched, I have expressly said, on condition of there being new stimuli and new excitements. Now life abounds in these, and sometimes they are such critical and revolutionary experiences that they change a man's whole scale of values and system of ideas. In such cases, the old order of his habits will be ruptured; and, if the new motives are lasting, new habits will be formed, and build up in him a new or regenerate 'nature.'

In a short paper, discuss an example (different from your first paper) of a character who is 'on the way't to a deadly sin or who is there, but who changes course, stalls or breaks the habit. Explain the relevant sin, then explain how it is the the change occurs. What happens? Why does it cause the character to make such a drastic change? Is the change believable? Why/why not? Explain. Be sure along the way to make a convincing case both for the characters involvement with the sin and for his or her about-face, change of heart.

Due on Friday at midnight.

Aquinas' Article IV is remarkable. In it, he explains what he calls "a three-fold principle" involved in human actions (i.e., properly human actions). The first principle is reason or will (also referred to as "the superior appetite"), the second is the sensible appetite (irascible or concupiscible appetite), and the third is the exterior member (hands, feet, etc.).

One striking feature of this three-fold principle is the way in which the sensible appetites differ from the exterior members. According to Aquinas, the exterior members unresistingly obey the orders of the appetites without any resistance. (Of course, you could be tied up, or ill, and so on.) The sensible appetites, however, can resist reason or the will. This is because the sensible appetites have inclinations as part of their nature--and so it is possible for them to resist reason or will or to obey it "with repugnance". What does it mean for the sensible appetites to have inclinations as a part of their nature?

Let's understand the point like this: The sensible appetites are appetites, natural desires. So the concupiscible appetite is an appetite, a natural desire, for pleasure. My concupiscible appetite might move me to eat something, say a large and gooey slab of chocolate cake, for the pleasures it would give me both of satisfying my hunger and of taste. But imagine that I am struggling to diet; I weigh too much. Reason commands me not to eat the slab. Now, in such a case, my reason may prevail--its command may be obeyed. But since the appetite is drawn toward the cake, strongly drawn, then the appetite will likely resist the command, and, if the appetite gives in and obeys, it will do so with sorrow. (In other words: I will not eat the cake, but I will refrain regretfully, in disappointment, wishing I could eat it even while I do not.) Or my concupiscible appetite may prevail; I eat the cake against reason or will--champing, chomping, crunching and craunching.

This example shows the crucial importance of virtue. If I am a temperate man, then I will have so trained my sensible appetites that they obey reason in something like the way my exterior members do (as if reason were despotic, and as sensible appetite had no faculty of resistance of its own). For Aquinas, virtuous action is uniform, ready and pleasurable. So if I am temperate, and I confront the slab of cake, if reason or will commands me not to eat, I will not eat. I will refrain without disappointment; indeed, my refraining will be pleasurable to me, insofar as it is an exercise of temperance. I will experience no inner discord. I will not wish to eat the cake even while I do not eat it. The training, the habituation, that I have undergone has developed in my concupiscible appetite a habit of obeying the superior appetite with facility (reliably, readily and pleasurably)--and this habit is a virtue; it is temperance. It is "seated" in the concupiscible appetite. (The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of the irascible appetite and fortitude.)

Aquinas believes that reason, the practical intellect, is the "seat" of justice and of prudence. But justice is seated differently, we might say, than prudence is. Justice requires us to care about the goods of others, not only of ourselves. It takes us beyond the limits of our individuality. Because that is so, it does not involve our natural desires in the same way as do the virtues of the sensible appetite. Prudence is the habit of judging rightly about singular human actions, of recognizing what is good in them. It is directly connected to my natural desires and it informs all of the appetites, whether superior or sensible. (So prudence informs justice, fortitude and temperance.)