A student in a past class asked a great question about Sloth and the other vices it can cause, like Avarice, Gluttony and Lust. The point of his question was whether, as a matter of fact, if Sloth causes another vice, like Lust, then the Sloth must end when Lust begins.
We might say that Sloth has to end, since the Lustful person clearly partakes of aim-driven activity, namely the search for sexual gratification. Thus, the aimlessness characteristic of Sloth seems incompatible with the aim-driven nature of Lust. Sloth can cause Lust. But Sloth cannot co-exist with Lust. We might however say that Sloth must continue to exist, because it "feeds" Lust: Lust is a constant reaction to Sloth, and in order for that to be true, Sloth must still be present, must co-exist with Lust. Call these two positions (A) and (B) respectively. The student favored (A) when we last talked; I favored (B). Who is right?
I now think neither of us is quite right, although each of us is tracking something. To explain, I need some distinctions from Aristotle. Aristotle distinguishes two types of potentiality and two types of actuality, but the second type of potentiality and the first type of actuality are the same. Here's what he means. Consider a baby born to English speakers. It is a potential speaker of English. That means that the child (assuming it is normal and its environment typical) will eventually acquire the ability to speak English. But of course it cannot now speak English. Compare to the baby a teenager who is sulky and silent. The teenager is more than a potential speaker of English as the baby is, but, since the teenager refuses to speak, the teenager can be called a potential speaker of English in another sense. To see that, compare the teenager to an adult who is now speaking English. The adult is actually a speaker of English. Compared to the adult, the teenager is potentially a speaker of English (the teenager could speak if he wanted to do so and would need nothing more than the will to do so to begin to speak). Compared to the teenager, the baby is a potential speaker of English, but in a different sense, because the baby cannot speak if it wants to and would need training to begin to speak). Call the baby a potential(1) speaker of the language and the teenager a potential(2) speaker. We can also say that, compared to the baby, the teenager is an actual speaker of the language, but in a different sense from the adult, so we can also say the teenager is an actual(1) speaker of the language. The adult is an actual(2) speaker of the language. And so the teenager is simultaneously a potential(2) and actual(1) speaker of the language, since we can compare him to the baby or the speaking adult. (Whew!)
I believe we can apply these sorts of distinctions to the issue between the student and me. The person whose Lust is caused by Sloth is not merely potentially(1) Slothful. No, he has been Slothful and in a sense still is. But at the moment when he is actually(2) Lustful, he is not actually(2) Slothful. Instead, he is potentially(2)/actually(1) Slothful. He is not actually(2) Slothful, since his aim-driven Lust prevents that. But his Lust is a constant reaction to Sloth and so Sloth must be present in more than a potential(1) sense. It seems to me that the best thing is to say that he is actually(2) Lustful but potentially(2)/actually(1) Slothful. He could relapse into (and likely does relapse into) Sloth at any moment, but especially when his Lust is either frustrated or sated. This strikes me as a new view, call it (C). It is like the student's (A), in that the Lustful person is not, while Lustful, fully actually Slothful (actually(2) Slothful). But it is like my (B) in that the Lustful person, while not fully actually Slothful, is still in a sense Slothful (potentially(2)/actually(1) Slothful).
So I think the student and I are both wrong in a sense and right in a sense. Often, that's how debates go in philosophy.

